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INTRODUCTION
The Domkhok (sDom khog)1 Township is 
remembered by its senior generation residents as 
a place teeming with wildlife, and literally covered 
with deer antlers and wild yak bones. The migration 
stories of the Metsang (dMe tshang) people say that 
before they finally settled in Domkhok, they used 
the land in the Dom (sDom) river valley as seasonal 
hunting grounds. The tribe’s ancestors are praised 
in the elderly people’s stories for their courage in 
meeting the real owners of the land: the wild yaks or 
drong (’brong). Some of the huge yak skulls exposed 
on the house roofs are said to date back to that time. 
The name Dom too, is said to bear witness to those 
days when the dom or Tibetan bear walked freely 
through these empty lands undisturbed by its human 
neighbors.  
The hunting paradise the Metsang people found 
belongs to the memories of how it was when the 
first Metsang hunters set foot on this land. Hunting 
1. Tibetan words are transcribed according to their local 
pronunciation. The Wylie transliteration in brackets indicates the 
Tibetan spelling. 
and weapons are no longer discussed today, but 
today Domkhok’s fame stems from something utterly 
different. When Deng Xiaoping’s 1980s reforms 
opened the door to private trade and allowed a 
rise in the market price of the caterpillar fungus or 
Ophiocordyceps sinensis2, Domkhok turned out to 
be a valuable source of this sought-after medicinal 
product. The local nomadic pastoralists were given 
a chance to earn other than livestock-related income 
and build their prosperity under the new Household 
Responsibility system. Domkhok Township started 
attracting scores of people from outside Golok, who, 
under changing policy regimes, paid high digging 
2. Ophiocordyceps sinensis is a fungus endemic to the 
Tibetan plateau, and noted from the Tibetan areas of China and 
from along-the-Himalaya-belt in Nepal, Bhutan and India. It is an 
entomophagous fungus feeding on larvae of certain populations 
or species of moths of Thitarodes. Infecting the larvae the fungus 
“consumes” the tissues of the host organism and completes its 
living cycle by producing spores which will infect new hosts. The 
Ophiocordyceps’ hybrid look gave it its Tibetan (yartsa gunbu; 
dbyar rtsa dgun ’bu) and Chinese name (dong chong xia cao) or 
“summer grass winter worm”, as well as its English appellation: 
caterpillar fungus. It is used in medicine production, as a diet 
supplement and in a rich “gift” culture; cf. Winkler 2008a, b and 
more; Devkota 2008 and 2006, and Sharma 2004. 
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for Nick Park
This paper analyzes the “disappearing sheep” phenomenon that has occurred due to the selling off of entire 
flocks of sheep by nomadic households, as observed in Domkhok Township in Golok Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture of Qinghai Province, and relates it to the rise of the caterpillar fungus economy.  Gathering and 
sale of the fungus, as well as leasing the land use rights to gatherers, bring for local pastoralists an income 
unmatched in size by anything else available to the rural population of Golok.  The paper shows how the 
availability of this new source of income changes the local nomadic pastoralists’ ways of managing livestock 
production which, prior to the boom, was the basis of their households’ budgets. The paper contextualizes 
different decisions made regarding yak and sheep production in terms of the pastoralists’ own cultural and 
economic rationales. Although in the last decade state investments have changed the economy of the area, 
the changes discussed in this paper have been possible due to the emergence of the new caterpillar fungus-
related economy rather than because of this state investment. This paper furnishes comparative data for 
studying economic performance and social change throughout rural Tibet in the first decade of the Open 
Up the West campaign.
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the caterpillar fungus market or due to emergence of other 
income opportunities coming from outside the pastoral 
economy. This study also adds to knowledge of what happens 
to pastoral economies in situations of rapid modernization 
and increased marketization.
This article is based on long-term anthropological research 
conducted in Machen County of Golok (mGo log) Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) of Qinghai Province, China, 
between 2007 and 2010.  It uses officially published numbers 
on the economic status of Domkhok, from both the widely-
available online and more “confidential” local government 
circulated sources, and compares them with the findings of 
the author’s own survey.3 The quantitative data from these 
sources is supplemented by information from interviews 
and informal conversations with a wide group of informants 
ranging from pastoralists to officials of various levels of 
state administration. Information from the interviews helps 
evaluate the data from the other two sources (quantitative 
from official records and from my survey) and sets them in 
the frame of human reasoning and choices made. 
STUDIED AREA
What is today Domkhok Township has been under the 
jurisdiction of Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of 
Qinghai Province since 1955.4 It is part of Machen (rMa chen) 
County, and enjoys a favorable location 33 kilometers distant 
from the town of Tawu (rTa wo) or Golok’s administration 
centre. The prefecture lies at the average altitude of 4,100m 
(Domkhok’s average altitude is 3,800m) above sea level and is 
characterized by a high plateau climate with an average yearly 
temperature of 0.4˚C (0.6˚C in Domkhok). This makes mobile 
animal husbandry the most suitable economy, and yak and 
sheep breeding has for many centuries been the main source 
of subsistence income for Golok’s population. In Domkhok 
(where 99 percent of the population is Tibetan), out of 1,812 
residents 1,752 persons (or 397 households) are rural-based 
and engage in the livestock economy.
The township is inhabited by a community identifying 
itself as Wranakh (sBra nag).5 The township has been created 
from territories which, in a traditional sense, belonged to 
the Metsang tribe or dewa (lde ba).6 In the “old society” (as 
3. I am far from both taking the official statistics at face value as well 
as discrediting them as useless for academic purposes, for reasons similar to 
those discussed by Fischer (2005: 6ff). The statistics used in this study emerge 
from the “cooperation” between the data collectors and the pastoralists: 
supplying inaccurate data is also in their interest. Such is the case when the 
informants “surmise that their behaviors can be taken into consideration in 
the (re)distribution of goods which are important for them or can serve as 
the basis for the institution to evaluate them” and are driven by “the desire 
to obtain certain goods or the desire to show themselves from a good side, 
and as a consequence—by social values to which the informants relate their 
position and behavior” (Sułek 1988: 17). 
4. Golok TAP was founded as an Autonomous Region in 1954. In 1955 
the name was changed to “Prefecture”. 
5. For more on the Wranakh tribes cf. Sułek 2010.
6. Metsang is customarily referred to as dewa. Tsowa (tsho ba), a similar 
term also in use in Golok, is usually associated with bigger divisions, such as 
fees and searched the grassland for caterpillar fungus, thus 
directly and indirectly contributing to the improvement in the 
township’s economic position. 
Two decades later Domkhok continues to be seen as a 
paradise for private diggers, who risk hardships and law-
breaking to enter it in the caterpillar fungus gathering season. 
At the same time the township has undergone visible changes, 
and the income from the fungus gathering has been one of 
the engines of many developments in the area. Whether done 
with public or private money, the results made Domkhok an 
example of how development in pastoral regions in Qinghai 
should look: the prefecture’s official guests are given tours 
through the township and shown the level of progress and 
improved life conditions of the pastoralists. More and more 
houses are being built, the roads get better and better, and 
the mobile phone coverage reaches deeper into the highlands. 
Meanwhile, from Domkhok’s natural landscape other animals 
are disappearing. After the wild yaks, alive in the stories about 
the past, the time has come for sheep.
THE AIM AND THE DATA
This paper focuses on the decline in the number of sheep 
owned by nomadic Tibetan pastoralists in China: decline not 
in the sense of increased sales but sales-off, when nomadic 
households sell off entire flocks of sheep at one time. This 
phenomenon was casually reported on earlier, but no study 
up to this date attempted at a systematic explanation of the 
motives that bring the pastoralists to this sheep selling off 
decision. This paper analyzes the dynamics and scale of the 
“disappearing sheep” phenomenon as observed in Domkhok 
Township, and reveals the rationale for the local actors’ 
decisions. It analyzes the pastoralist households’ budgets and 
shows what contribution sheep production can have for their 
economy. 
I argue that declining sheep numbers should be analyzed 
together with the emergence of the new, non-pastoral sources 
of income. In the case of Domkhok Township, this is cash 
income from gathering Ophiocordyceps sinensis, as well as the 
sale and leasing of land to others for that purpose. Among 
the reasons contributing to the decrease are changes in 
demographics in the area (smaller households do not have 
enough of a work force for sheep breeding), insufficient 
grass resources and state policies aimed at reducing livestock 
numbers to improve the quality of the grassland environment. 
The focus however is on the economic factor. Without it, 
I argue, the decision to sell off the sheep would be more 
difficult to make. 
Domkhok Township is a good case for studying the 
consequences of the growth of the trade in non-pastoral 
products for the nomads’ other basic economic occupations. 
Decreased dependence on pastoral income and growing 
reliance on other sources is not unique to the studied 
area. This paper contributes to our understanding of 
transformations which pastoral economies in Tibetan areas of 
China or elsewhere undergo–either due to their exposure to 
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the time prior to the effective incorporation of the discussed 
territories into the People’s Republic of China is called), all the 
lands whose waters end in the Dom and Chieb (Khyeb) rivers 
(both belong to the Ma/rMa or Yellow River basin) constitute 
the Metsangs’ property. The Metsangs split into three sub-
branches, of which two are to be found in Domkhok. The 
first richen (ri chen)7, with Tanchen (Tang chen/Dwangs 
chen) as its main part, is mostly inhabited by Metsang Jarkor 
(rGya skor), and the second, in the proper Dom river valley, is 
where Metsang Sangrkor (Sangs skor) dominate. This article 
is based on material gathered in the latter.
DOMKHOK AND HER NEIGHBORS
Domkhok Township is often said to be the most 
prosperous township in Golok – so the local state officials 
and other informants say. In the common thinking, reflected 
at the level of stereotypes and gossiping, this economic 
success of Domkhok is generalized over other non-Golok 
Tibetan natives of Machen, who are believed by their 
neighbors to be more affluent and better connected than 
the rest of the “average” Goloks. This view, leveling all those 
Tibetan nomadic pastoralists who are not Goloks in this part 
of the prefecture, can be partly justified when one looks at 
the whole of Machen County with its peculiarities. With 
Chongmar (Tib. Khrong dmar alias Chamahe)8 and the other 
three townships, Yigzhung (dByug gzhung), Tanzhung (Tang 
gzhung/Dwangs gzhung) and Tanlag (Tang legs/Dwangs 
legs), whose land is of low productivity and population (all 
of Golok stock) covered by the resettlement project at the 
one end, and Gangri (Gangs ri, Chin. Xueshan) or Domkhok 
(inhabited by the Wranakhs) with their fertile pasturelands 
at the other, the county illustrates the different scenarios the 
pastoral communities can face. Table 1 provides background 
information about all the eight townships (xiang) and two 
towns (zhen) of Machen.9 
Domkhok’s production base can be looked at from two 
angles: of grassland resources and of livestock ownership and 
income. Of Domkhok’s total area of 11,695 qi10 (circa 780 km²) 
91.59 percent is classified as grassland, leaving 8.41 percent 
for mountain ranges and areas out of human use. Of the 
grassland, about 674 km² or 86.39 percent of the township’s 
total land area is or can be in actual use. This is a high rate, 
although not dissimilar to other parts of Machen11, where this 
Wranakh of which Metsang is a part. 
7. Richen (Chin. dadui) and richung (ri chung, Chin. xiaodui) are 
names used for administration units under the township.  
8. Similar to Gangri, Chongmar functions in Golok under its Chinese 
name Chamahe.  
9. The data come from Machen County’s statistical yearbook (MSY 
2009; 11ff, 44ff, 60) and the County’s official website: www.maqin.gov.cn/
html/143/5688/html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5684.html, www.maqin.
gov.cn/html/143/5691/html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5690/html, www.
maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5686/html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/2046/
html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5687/html. 
10. A Chinese area unit, equals 100 mu or 6.67 hectares. 
11. Rarja (Ra rgya), since it is not of purely pastoral, but mixed pastoral-
agricultural character, is not listed here.
usable grassland ratio is, for example, 79.13 percent in Tawu 
xiang, 90.36 percent in Yigzhung, 81 percent in Tanzhung, 
87.16 percent in Tanlag, 80.42 percent in Chongmar, a very 
high 94.01 percent in Tawu zhen and, visibly less, in Tawu 
Zhuma (rTa wo zhol ma) – 68.58 percent and Gangri – 68.93 
percent. Calculating stocking rates in the total area of usable 
grassland is problematic, since the grassland contracted and 
used does not have to be identical with the grassland deemed 
usable. If the land contracted to the pastoralists was similar to 
the area of usable grassland the stocking rates for Domkhok 
would be: four animals (one yak, three sheep) per qi of land 
or 60 animals per square kilometer (14 yaks, 46 sheep).12 
As regards people’s livelihood and livestock ownership, an 
average Domkhok household (taking the data from Table 1 
as reliable) would own 110 animals, including 26 yaks and 
84 sheep. This is not the highest rate of livestock ownership, 
and in Gangri the numbers are higher: 138 animals in total, 
including 42 yaks and 95 sheep. For Tawu xiang, the numbers 
are: 107 animals per household (22 yaks and 84 sheep) and 
for Tawu Zhuma 93 animals per household (29 yaks and 63 
sheep). For the rest of Machen the numbers are: Yigzhung 
37 animals (11 yaks, 26 sheep), Tanlag 49 animals (32 yaks, 
16 sheep) and Tawu zhen 85 animals (61 yaks, 23 sheep). 
Annual income statistics are not an adequate representation 
of the pastoralists’ incomes, but show disparities between 
different parts of Machen. Here the leading position goes 
to Gangri with 5,319 yuan per person – this township was 
made known as having one of the highest per capita incomes 
in Golok by Goldstein (1996: 18). The second place goes 
to Tawu xiang (5,305 yuan), and the third to Domkhok 
(5,091 yuan). Other townships have average rural incomes 
significantly lower: 3,277 yuan for Tawu Zhuma, 3,341 yuan 
for Rarja, 2,937 yuan for Tanlag, 2,189 yuan for Yigzhung 
and 1,290 yuan for Tawu zhen. The relative affluence of the 
Gangri-Domkhok-Tawu trio relates to the medicinal fungus 
Ophiocordyceps sinensis. 
OPHIOCORDYCEPS IN DOMKHOK
Based on estimated numbers Domkhok is one of the 
leading producers of Ophiocordyceps in Machen, if not in 
the whole of Golok. No information about the amount of 
Ophiocordyceps gathered is included in the official statistics,13 
but Domkhok officials, interviewed in the course of this study, 
estimate that each year the Township sells between 1,000 
to 2,000 jin14 (half to one ton) of the fungus. The average 
quality, measured by the larger size and heavier weight of the 
12. Numbers of horses in Domkhok are insignificant compared to yaks 
or sheep. Yet, one can read them from the difference between yak and sheep 
numbers and the total livestock population in Table 1.
13. According to Li et al. Machen produces 6.4 tons of the fungus per 
year, but only 20 percent of that is gathered (2010: 32). This number seems 
too low, given the size of the seasonal influx of gatherers into the county. 
Since the number of gatherers does not decrease there must be resources 
which can support such a mass of diggers. For more on measuring how much 
yartsa Tibet produces, cf. Winkler 2010. 
14. Chinese weight unit which equals 500g. 
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fungus (which determine how many specimens one jin or 
half a kilogram contains) is 1,500 to 2,000 pieces per jin or 
3,000 to 4,000 per kg. High quality fungus from the valleys 
of Drilung (’Bri lung), Wirkung (Bas sgong) and Churu (Chu 
ros/Chu rul) reaches 1,000 or fewer pieces per jin (2,000 or 
less per kg).15 This quality fungus gets the highest prices and 
in April-May 2010 in Tawu was paid even 70,000 yuan and 
more per jin or 140,000 yuan per kilogram. In summer 2010, 
it equaled circa 7000 and 14,000 euro.
The amounts of the fungus gathered by individual 
households are not easy to study. The pastoralists widely 
underreport the size of their “harvests,” trying to show their 
land as of not good value, their income insignificant, and their 
intervention into the grassland environment smaller. It is not 
uncommon to hear declarations that a household gathered 
“one thousand pieces” only. Observation conducted in the 
field shows the opposite: a skilful gatherer can find a hundred 
or so pieces in one day.16 According to the township leaders’ 
estimations a single household should be able to gather two 
and a half or even three kilograms of the fungus in a season. 
This would mean approximately 200,000 yuan income per 
household as a whole. 
The above numbers give only a partial picture of the 
economic importance of Ophiocordyceps for Domkhok 
inhabitants. Another, more substantial income is from leasing 
15. The lower the number of single fungi in one jin the better the 
quality. The fungus from Yushu (Yul shul) TAP can give even 700 pieces per 
half a kilogram. But in Nepal, for example, even the biggest yartsa is so small 
that one never gets less than 2,000 fungi per half a kilogram (Shiva Devkota, 
pers. comm., November 11, 2010). 
16. Winkler recorded 120 fungi gathered by a seventeen year old 
nomad (personal communication, December 17, 2010).
the land use rights to persons from outside of Domkhok, 
who pay high fees to get into the township for gathering. 
The legal aspects of leasing the land are complicated. As 
long as the tenants are from within the prefecture and have 
a rural registered hukou (household registration book), their 
situation is safe. Legal regulations passed in Golok in 2007-
2010 forbid, however, leasing the land to gatherers from 
beyond Golok (EXP 2010: 4, and Winkler 2008c: 1). Control 
points at the prefecture’s roads are supposed to “sieve” the 
illegal diggers off the Golok residents. In spite of a variety 
of measures the administration takes, the local population 
continues leasing their land for caterpillar fungus digging. 
According to the official estimates, each year Domkhok is 
visited by around 10,000 diggers, among whom persons from 
other parts of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan dominate.17
The gathering fees are decided either by individual 
households or by groups of households (when they use their 
pastures together or prefer to have one policy to prevent 
possible conflicts and competition in the future). The fee 
depends on a locality and the quality of its yartsa and on 
the current price of the fungus. So, the fluctuations in the 
yartsa market prices between 2007 and 2010 were reflected 
in the ups and downs of fee levels. For example, in Wirkung, 
known for its rich resources (in 2010 the most successful 
17. It would mean that during the gathering season the number of 
migrants outnumbers the locals by five to one. If an average family leases the 
land out to twenty diggers, their number would reach almost 8,000 persons. 
To this number has to be added “thieves”, as the locals say, who sneak into 
Domkhok without paying fees. Yet another group consists of herders or 
“helping hands” hired to help with household tasks. It is common that they 
are paid in yartsa: they can go gathering yartsa together with all household 
members. 
Township 
(xiang)/ 
town 
(zhen)
Permanent 
Residents 
(Pastoralists)
Households
Land Area 
(in qi/km²)
Grassland
(in qi/km²)
Usable
Grassland
(in qi/km²)
Livestock Yaks Sheep
Annual Income
per Person
(in yuan)
1
Domkhok 
xiang
1,723 369
11,695/
779.67
10,712/
714.13
10,104/
673.60
40,958 9,441 31,012 5,091
2.
Gangri 
xiang
1,804 458
20,264/
1350
15,292/
1019.47
15,292/
942.67
63,246 19,315 43,300 5,319
3.
Tawu
xiang
3,989 956
27,206/
1813.73
22,578/
1505.20
22,578/
1,438.33
102,729 21,320 80,054 5,305
4.
Shar Tawu 
xiang
1,536 378
24,615/
1641
18,260/
1217.33
16,882/
1,125.47
35,120 10,959 23,700 3,277
5.
Rarja
zhen
10,197 2,235
39,393/
2626
38,464/
2564.27
32,251/
 2,150.07 
168,705 85,283 81,388 3,341
6.
Chongmar1
xiang
- -
17,289/
1152
14,497/
966.47
13,897/
926.47
 - -  - -
7.
Tanlag
xiang 
3,691 791
26,023/
1734.87
23,791/
1586.07
22,682/
1,512.13
38,867 25,611 12,599 2,937
8.
Tanzhung
xiang
- -
9,885/
659
8,385/
559
8,007/
533.80
 -  - - -
9.
Yigzhung
xiang
2,493 600
22,137/
1475.80
1,399.27
20,004/
1,333.60
22,455 6,889 15,270 2,189
10.
Tawu 
Zhen
915 301
12,047/
803.13
11,779/
785.27
11,326/
755.07
25,727 18,508 6,972 1,290
Table 1: Ground data for eight townships and two towns of Machen County, Golok TAP, 2008.
1. The latest data for Chongmar and Tanzhung come from 2005 and 2007, and due to time difference have not been included (apart from values for the land and 
grassland area). 
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digger claimed having found 300 pieces in one day18), the 
fees were:
However high the fees might seem, when the current 
market price for fungus is good, there is never a lack of persons 
willing to dig. In fact, at the end of one gathering season 
all the best digging localities are contracted for the coming 
year. Some degree of flexibility in arranging the payment is 
possible (the diggers can sometimes pay after the season), but 
many pastoralists state their unwillingness to compromise: “If 
they can’t pay, they can’t dig. If they have no cash, there is 
no way.” This is accompanied by other statements on how 
much sought after the digging “positions” are and how many 
people “queue” to pay for what other candidates cannot 
afford. Similar statements show who in this situation is (or 
at least feels to be) the side dictating the conditions of the 
cooperation. 
The size of this enormous seasonal flow of people can be 
seen in the example of Wirkung, whose inhabitants decided 
not to let in more than eighty gatherers per season. In this 
case, the quality of the land justifies the high fee and allows 
the land “owners” to earn enough (80 diggers times 10,000 
earns 800,000 yuan to share between four households) 
without risking their own security or too obvious land 
degradation.19 In other places, where the residents do not 
have a common policy, and the grassland is of lower quality, 
the number of diggers is higher: to Mechen (dMe chen) 
valley up to three hundred diggers come every year (but the 
fee in 2010 was only 5,000 to 6,000 yuan). Probably the 
most extreme case comes from Gangri Township, where the 
gathering fees reach an astronomic 20,000 yuan per person. 
In a widely commented on incident from 2008, a family from 
Gangri leased their pastureland to 360 diggers at one time. 
This case became public when the prefecture and county 
officials became alarmed by information they received from a 
“secret” source and took action to check the actual situation. 
The consequences of this extravagant contract were sad: the 
pastureland was confiscated, and two years later the family 
was still appealing to various institutions trying to get the 
land back. 
18. Such good “harvests” are not common (this number is from the 
beginning of the gathering season) but suggests what mass of yartsa the 
valley produces. 
19. Eighty persons might seem enough to create trouble for a small 
pastureland and the non-Tibetan diggers are often accused by the pastoralists 
of not “handling” the digging properly (it is said that they do not close the 
holes in the ground created by the removing of the fungus). However, as my 
informants from the county administration reported, eighty diggers is still a 
number tolerated by the authorities. 
LIVESTOCK ECONOMY IN DOMKHOK 
Before the Ophiocordyceps gathering boom started, 
Domkhok pastoralists depended on their “traditional” yak and 
sheep breeding economy. In 2008 (sources quoted in Table 1) 
the total livestock population was reported to be 41,003 head 
(9,462 yaks and 31,032 sheep). More recent numbers (given 
in a document circulated among the township cadres, and 
read to me by my informant in 2010) were: 7,742 yaks and 
28,351 sheep.20 The township officials themselves estimate 
the average livestock ownership in 2010 as follows:
Households Yaks Sheep Horses % in the township
Middle-affluent 50 50-100 2 50%
Poor 10-20 0 1 20-25%
Rich 200-280 300 3-6 25-30%
Table 3: Estimated livestock ownership per household, Domkhok Township, 
Machen County, Golok TAP, 2010.
Just as it was with sizes of the caterpillar fungus 
“harvests”, numbers of livestock owned are sensitive topics 
in public conversations. The environmental protection laws, 
which insist on reducing the pressure from the herds on the 
pastureland, cause the pastoralists to hide the real size of 
their herds. The figures from the official sources are based on 
numbers “allowed” or “acceptable” rather than representing 
de facto ownership by the nomads. My survey showed that the 
smallest single herd in Domkhok never went below fifty yaks, 
the average ownership was between seventy and eighty yaks, 
and families owning a hundred or more were not infrequent. 
SHEEP OWNERSHIP
There is a saying, “There are three kinds of lies: lies, 
damned lies and statistics,” which Mark Twain made popular. 
The sheep records from Domkhok should be approached 
with reservation, which the saying calls for. Both the officially 
published data and officials’ “private” estimations do not 
adequately enumerate the sheep population and its current 
decline. If we round up the number of Domkhok households 
to 400 and take the sheep head numbers from Table 3 as 
factual, we would have to agree that over 50,000 sheep (plus 
about 40,000 yaks) graze on the township’s pasturelands. This 
number not only exceeds the official data to an improbable 
degree, but cannot be accepted for another reason: even a 
casual visit to Domkhok reveals that something is missing 
from the grassland. The sheep are missing. 
The decline of the sheep population was observed not 
only in Domkhok but also in the rest of Golok and other 
parts of Qinghai inhabited by Tibetan pastoralists (Ptackova: 
20. These and the following figures come from a series of interviews 
with the township officials. Each of them was asked to estimate the values 
(Table 3) of average livestock ownership for middle-affluent, poor and rich 
households. “Rich” or “poor” indicate “poverty” or “affluence” as measured 
by livestock ownership. In present-day Golok, rural households’ economic 
standing does not directly depend on the numbers of livestock owned. 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Gathering fee per 
person (in yuan) 
15,000 5,000 7,000 10,0002
Table 2: Ophiocordyceps gathering fees 2007-2010, Wirkung valley, 
Domkhok Township, Machen County, Golok TAP.
2. This is not the highest gathering fee of Domkhok 2010: in Tanchen the 
fees reached 15,000 yuan, and in Gangri Township they were even higher.   
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not inherit the mother’s status, and are edible). State statistics 
record total numbers, without differentiating between the 
status of two sheep. In my survey, however, the focus was on 
the animals as production means. Hence, from the following 
diagram, tsethar sheep are excluded:  
Figure 1: Sheep ownership (excluding tsethar animals), Domkhok Township, 
Machen County, Golok TAP, 2009. 
The above figure shows the proportion of the number of 
families still owning sheep and those who do not have any 
“productive” sheep anymore. 83 percent of today’s no-sheep 
households consist of two sub-groups: those who sold their 
herds off and those who never had any sheep. The latter 
group comprises of young households established within the 
last decade. The decline in the importance of sheep can be 
seen also in the fact that parents or in-laws who still keep 
their own sheep do not give them to the younger generation, 
as if sheep breeding was not a profession for the future.
The reasons for sheep sell off by the pastoralists in 
Domkhok are various. The households that decided to sell all 
their animals in the last decade indicated several difficulties 
in sheep raising, which contributed to their decision. These 
include reasons of environmental and demographic character, 
namely: (1) lack of labor for sheep herding, (2) insufficient 
land, (3) declining quality of grass, which, in spite of the 
family’s theoretically sufficient pastureland, cannot feed yaks 
and sheep at the same time and, finally, (4) a harsh climate 
in Golok, making it difficult for the lambs to survive. These 
four (arranged according to the frequency of answers given) 
are added to by (5) lack of guns to protect the herds against 
wolves. These reasons have cumulative effect (they strengthen 
each other). A forty year old herder, owning 130 yaks (he sold 
his 220 sheep in 2002) cited winter colds and high altitude 
(which affect sheep more than yaks), the effort owners must 
make to herd sheep, and their vulnerability to predation by 
wolves as reasons which pushed him to quit sheep breeding. 
As in Huntington’s explanation for waves of 
democratization (1993: 50), the reasons for the decline in 
the sheep population should be bi-modal. To explain why 
this decline has happened, one needs to look into both: why 
the sheep are sold off, but also why they are not. It is thus 
worth investigating the opinion of those who, in spite of the 
declared obstacles, make the seemingly economically unviable 
decision of retaining their flocks. Against explanations citing 
the quality or quantity of grassland or the lack of human 
resources, arguments of emotional or “cultural” character 
were put forward. Herders declared their fondness for sheep 
or their attachment to tradition. They described those who 
sold off the sheep as “lazy,” saying that this and not anything 
else explained why people sell their animals off. It is important 
that the economic standing of the ex-sheep owners is not 
substantially different to those who continue to raise sheep. 
If the households that sold their sheep are of similar size and 
are as able to mobilize labor, and have land of similar extent 
and sometimes better quality, the motives for sheep selling 
can be sought outside of the five reasons listed above. These 
2010). In Domkhok the decline in sheep numbers is variously 
estimated, depending on the source. An official, who has 
served on high positions in the township administration 
structures for thirteen years, estimated that within this period 
the sheep population dropped 40 percent.21 Another official 
estimated a 60 percent decrease. Furthermore, the township 
administrators noted that some 30 percent of families do not 
own any sheep in Domkhok today, while in the late 1990s it 
was only five percent. In reality, sheep numbers are smaller 
than the above estimates suggest. The survey I conducted 
showed that sheep owning families were in a striking minority, 
and rarely more than two out of ten households could pride 
themselves on continuing to practice this branch of their 
economy. 
There is one explanation that clarifies the gap between 
official data and observations from this study. Sheep breeding 
for sale and household consumption and sheep “keeping” are 
two separate things. Certainly a large number of households 
keep some sheep, for which tsethar (tse thar) or the ritual of 
liberating animals from the prospect of being slaughtered was 
performed.22 In Domkhok the majority of tsethar animals is 
female. Although, in Tibetan Buddhist theory, performing 
tsethar ritual for male animals makes more sense, since the 
males are more prone to end their life under the knife of a 
Muslim butcher, the pastoralists in Domkhok make their own 
choices.23 Families that sold their “productive” sheep off can 
still keep the “unslaughterable” animals. These sheep do not 
contribute to the household budget, unless they are still of 
reproductive age (if freed ewes happen to have lambs, these do 
21. This and following information from the conversations with the 
township administration employees of various levels were collected in June 
2010. Names of the informants and their positions are not given for generally 
accepted reasons. 
22. Tsethar is a Buddhist practice common throughout Tibet. A herd 
owner can select some of his animals and “grant” them life till natural death. 
The animal cannot be slaughtered and given/sold to anybody if there is a risk 
that it will be slaughtered. For more about tsethar cf. Holler 2000.
23. The Golok preference for female tsethar animals contrasts with the 
observations from Tibet Autonomous Region gathered in Holler 2000. In my 
area “theoretical” descriptions given by religious specialists on how the ritual 
should be performed diverged from the herders’ practice, who were blamed 
by some monk informants for ignorance about how a “proper” tsethar should 
be made.
Figure 1: Sheep ownership (excluding tsethar animals), Dmokhok Town-
ship Machen County, Golok TAP, 2009
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five certainly contribute to the decision making process, but a 
stronger stimulus must come from somewhere else. 
DESTOCKING AND CHINA’S NEW ECOLOGY
The state policy of Turning Pastureland into Grassland 
(Chin. Tuimu huancao) announced in 2003, stipulates that 
to restore the balance on the grasslands of large parts of West 
China, restrictions should be put on the scale of use of the 
pasturelands. In practical terms it means delineating zones 
temporarily closed to grazing, and others where grazing is 
banned on a permanent basis. It implies removing herds and 
people from their previous settlements and moving them to 
new urban or semi-urban ones. The resettlement policy has 
been implemented in twenty six of forty five townships in 
Golok TAP and official sources declare that 2,702 households 
have been moved to new settlements, and nearly 20,920 km² 
of grassland have been closed to grazing (GTH 2010). Apart 
from the resettlement, which is a widely commented upon 
facet of the new policy (Yeh 2005, Zukosky 2007, Foggin 
2008, Du 2009, Xun and Bao 2010), this new environmentalist 
turn in state thinking postulates limiting the sizes of herds 
owned by those nomadic pastoralists who are 
not covered by the resettlement program, and 
keeping them in constant check. 
Domkhok has not been covered by the 
resettlement program. For the local population 
the main contact with the environmentalist 
policies are the meetings organized in the 
township, where the pastoralists are lectured 
on the need to protect the environment. 
Although township leaders deny the 
existence of limits on livestock ownership, the 
pastoralists admit that they are not supposed 
to keep herds exceeding numbers calculated 
according to the scheme: one sheep per four 
mu of land, one yak equaling four sheep or 
sixteen mu of land. Since the tax abolition 
no control of the herd sizes was reported 
by people interviewed. And, since the fiscal 
duties to the state have been cancelled, none 
of them knew what consequences would 
occur should the township administration 
bring a case against persons caught stocking 
their grazing grounds above the limit: “We 
are told we must not keep more yaks than we 
can, but I’ve not heard of any fine for that.”
In none of the dozens of interviews with 
the Domkhok pastoralists was environmental 
protection mentioned in the context of sheep 
selling, and nobody signaled that he or she 
was told or forced to sell his or her sheep or 
that the policy influenced this decision in any 
significant way. When asked whether it is the 
state planners’ wish that Tibetan pastoralists 
sell their sheep off, the informants strongly 
asserted their autonomy in their decision making process. It 
can, of course, be argued that the lectures and discourse on 
environmental protection penetrate local society and create 
an atmosphere favoring sheep selling over sheep keeping. Yet 
it seems improbable that the Domkhok pastoralists’ massive 
sheep selling was or is a direct result of steps taken by the 
local authorities. 
DO SHEEP EARN MONEY? 
A chronology of economy-related events in Golok helps 
to clarify the background of the studied phenomenon. The 
first noted cases of clearing the grasslands of whole flocks of 
sheep in Domkhok dates from the year 2000. This timing was 
mentioned by local leaders and environmental activists. It 
is possible that some families reduced their sheep numbers 
in other Tibetan areas earlier, but only after 2000 did sheep 
selling in Domkhok become common. Figure 2 shows how 
the number of households which sold their flocks of sheep 
grew between 2000 and 2010 in the area studied. The data 
gathered come from altogether fifty households.
Figure 2 shows change in proportions between households 
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Figure 2: Approximate sheep sales in the area studied 2000-2010, Domkhok Township, 
Machen County, Golok TAP.
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sheep gives one jin and several shang of wool24). Shearing that 
number of sheep takes up to six hours of the collective work 
of ten people. The mathematics is simple: a day of work for six 
persons plus transporting the wool to town gives an income 
(in 2010 prices) of only 1400 yuan.25 Sheep skins are a ready 
by-product of sheep slaughter. The price is better: 20 to 60 
yuan depending on the animal’s age and size (20 yuan for 2-3 
year old, 30-50 yuan for adult females, and 60 yuan for the 
biggest males). Finally, sheep are sold for meat: an average 
animal weighing in at 15 kg fetched 350 yuan at the market. 
Neither Golok nor Wranakh nomads milk ewes, so milk is 
not a source of income To decide whether or not this price 
is worth the effort of sheep breeding is up to an individual’s 
assessment, but compared to the large sums paid for animal 
products in the past—some of them episodic and lasting a 
year or two, but well remembered by informants (such as 280 
yuan for sheep skins in 1995-1996)—recent prices seem less 
attractive and are often complained about.
Whether or not sheep production can substantially 
contribute to the household budget is shown in the example 
of two neighboring families: one holding on to their flock 
of sheep and another who had sold their flock. The first, 
Mr Dorji’s household (Table 4), had six members, owned 
“around a hundred” yaks, 200 sheep and four horses (all this 
information recorded in 2010). The second, Mr Tserdor’s 
household (Table 5) had seven members and owned 90 
yaks and six horses. Their sheep, totaling 170, were sold 
in 2006 due to, as Tserdor declared, big losses to wolves 
and a lack of people who had time to “look after them all 
day long.” Both households applied different strategies to 
generate income. Tserdor declared that his family did not 
sell any yaks in 2009 but instead increased sales of cheese 
and butter. Dorji’s household  relied on a more diversified 
array of income streams, leaving out only sales of the rough 
outer yak hair rtsipa (rtsid pa) and the soft undercoat kulu 
(khu lu): yak undercoat or yak cashmere price fell to 10 yuan 
per kg, which, as the family judged, made its production 
unprofitable (they recalled 24-26 yuan/kg paid in the late 
1990s). Both households shared their summer pastures, and 
their land produced similar amounts of Ophiocordyceps. Thus 
differences in the yartsa income, in the land quality or its size 
as a factor differentiating the families could be passed over. 
What makes it all the more like a “controlled comparison” 
is that both households had a similar structure and none of 
them could claim having more human resources than the 
other. 
24. Shang (srang) is a Tibetan weight unit equaling Chinese liao or 
around 37.5 g.  
25. Wool from Golok is of lower quality than that from Qilian mountains 
and other pastoral regions specializing in sheep production. Although a high 
employee of Qinghai Plateau Tibetan Sheep Carpet Co. Ltd assured me that 
their carpets are woven of Tibetan wool, local wool is pushed out of the 
market by imports from Australia and New Zealand. It is also not a secret 
that mutton served in Tibet is often imported from oversees, and finding a 
local sheep skin sufficient for a gonkha (gong kha) collar in a robe is next to 
impossible. 
which sold off their sheep and those which resisted this 
trend. It leaves out those families which never owned any 
sheep. The exponential curve of increase in the number 
of households which decided to quit sheep rearing shows 
a spectacular “jump” after 2004. Two dates can be helpful 
to contextualize this rapid change. In 2002, as the nomads 
recollect, the first caterpillar fungus gatherers arrived in 
Domkhok and paid the gathering fees directly to the nomads 
on whose land they wanted to stay. In 2004, the agricultural 
tax reform reached Domkhok. These two points, the reform 
in the yartsa gathering regulations and tax abolition, as the 
pastoralists say, have changed their fortunes. Domkhok’s 
economy is reported to have been steadily improving since 
the late 1980s, but in the 2000s the nomads’ income rose 
to heights unknown before, and yartsa gathering and fees 
became the central pillar of the households’ material well-
being. 
Seen in the context of this improvement in the pastoralist 
economy the growth in the sheep selling-off trend is not 
surprising. It is partly confirmed by the records of the 
largest slaughter house in Xining.  Its manager confirmed 
that the absolute peak in the numbers of sheep they bought 
from all over Qinghai was in 2006 when, according to his 
estimations, over three million sheep were sold for meat. Two 
Tibetan prefectures, Golok and Yushu, were their important 
suppliers. The same informant said that after 2006 the 
numbers of sheep sold went down and the market stabilized. 
My survey gives a similar impression: within the group of 
households studied none declared having sold off their sheep 
after 2007. 
Two questions from my survey are critical for 
understanding the fate of sheep in Domkhok: (1) “Would you 
ever sell your sheep if you didn’t have income from yartsa 
gunbu?” and (2) “Did you see any change in enthusiasm for 
the livestock breeding after the yartsa gunbu trade started?” 
Almost all persons answered “No” to the first, and “Yes” to the 
second question. While the answer given to the first one was 
usually followed with the herder’s rhetorical question, “What 
would I live from?”, the answers to the second one were more 
descriptive:
People have now good income such as they 
would never get from keeping animals. 
And prices for animal products are very 
low, which doesn’t help to increase people’s 
interest in keeping animals properly. Wool 
or sheep skins, or yak cashmere and hides, 
and even milk and meat can’t make you 
good money.
What then are the prices of sheep products at the market 
in Golok? In 2010, sheep wool earned around seven yuan 
per kilogram. A household owning a flock of 200 sheep can 
sell around 200 kg of wool in one year (an average Golok 
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Estimated 
quantity sold 
in one year 
(2009)3
Value per 
piece/kg
Total 
contribution
to the yearly 
budget
Yaks 10 2,000 yuan/yak 20,000
Yak hides 4 100 yuan/hide 400
Yak hair 
and cashmere - - -
Butter 50 kg 40 yuan/kg 2,000
Cheese 50 kg 26 yuan/kg 1,300
Sheep 50 350/sheep 17,500
Sheep skins 10 30 yuan/skins 300
Wool 200 kg 7 yuan/kg 1,400
Yartsa gathering 1,000 pieces - Not sold yet
Yartsa gathering 
fees 20 diggers, 10,000 yuan each 200,000
Total                                                             242,900
Table 4: Estimated income in Dorji’s household (owning sheep), Domkhok 
Township, Machen County, Golok TAP, 2010. 
3. The following numbers come from the pastoralists’ own estimations. The 
focus is on stable points in the budget, and all “occasional” earnings from 
selling a car, motorbike etc. are excluded from the tables.
Estimated 
quantity sold 
in one year 
(2009)
Value per 
piece/kg
Total 
contribution
to the yearly 
budget
Yaks - - -
Yak hides 4 90 yuan/hide 360
Yak hair 
and cashmere 35 kg 10 yuan/kg 350
Butter 100 kg 40 yuan/kg 4,000
Cheese 100 kg 26 yuan/kg 2,600
Sheep - - -
Sheep skins - - -
Wool - - -
Yartsa gathering 1.30 kg 54,000 yuan/kg 70,200
Yartsa gathering 
fees 20 diggers, 10,000 yuan each 200,000
Total 277,510
Table 5: Estimated income in Tserdor’s household (owning no sheep), 
Domkhok Township, Machen County Golok TAP, 2010. 
Sheep breeding is perceived as inconvenient by many for 
the same reason it is burdensome to Dorji’s household. The 
family’s senior members, over seventy years old, have retired 
to the village, where the family bought a house in 2002. Their 
teenage son lives with his grandparents in the village, and 
studies in a township school, while the elder daughter attends 
a boarding school in Tawu. Thus, out of six persons only two 
live permanently in the mountains. This results in a shortage 
of labor, which the family solved by employing a year-round 
resident shepherd from Huzhu (paid 10,000 yuan a year plus 
food and clothing). Furthermore, the 2,070 mu of land the 
family can use do not suffice, as they say, for the herds they 
own. This problem they solved by leasing a plot of land for 
winter grazing (5,000 yuan a year).
Dorji’s household is thus in a situation not so dissimilar 
from other Domkhok families, which echoed the sentiments 
of the informants from the Churu valley: 
We sold our [280] sheep last year [2009]. 
Our four grandchildren are at school, we 
[the interviewee and his wife] live in town. 
My son-in-law looks after the yaks, and 
there is nobody who could do the same for 
the sheep. It’s only two people there in the 
mountains. For a small family like us it’s 
not possible to keep sheep anymore.
However, in Churu more than half of the households hire 
“helping hands” (usually from Tibetan farming communities 
in Qinghai), who stay with them and take over the herding. 
The quoted family is not an exception. Dorji could also agree 
with some complaints expressed by yet another informant: 
We don’t have enough land. There is less 
and less grass every year, and so many abras 
(a bra)!26 The sheep don’t have enough to 
eat, so we sold them off. Anyway, almost 
everybody did.
However, around 20 percent (as the township leader 
estimated) of the Domkhok pastureland is leased between 
the households. So if the family wanted to keep their sheep 
they could probably manage to find a solution not only 
for the lack of working hands, but also for the shortage of 
grassland. In spite of observable problems and the need for 
extra investment to solve them, Dorji’s family not only did 
not sell the sheep, but, instead, enlarged their flocks. In 2009 
they bought an additional forty sheep (800 yuan each), which 
totals another 32,000 yuan of investment.  
Can the power of sentiment balance the difficulties in 
sheep breeding? With extra investment, probably yes. This 
cannot, however, mask the relatively small contribution the 
26. Abra or Plateau Pika (Lat. Ochotona curzoniae and other Ochotona) 
is a small burrowing animal widespread in Golok. It is considered a pest and 
targeted by poisoning and other actions aimed at reducing its population.
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sheep products make to the household’s finances. As shown 
in Table 4 and 5, sheep production takes place somewhere 
in the lower registers of profitability. While yartsa-related 
income reaches 82 percent in the sheep owning household 
(97 percent in the other one), sheep production contributes 
slightly more than seven percent. The income from yartsa 
wins in this competition also by how quickly one can earn it: 
it is quick money, earned in two months. It also requires little 
effort: its major part comes not from the fungus which the 
family members gathered themselves, but from their actions 
as managers of the gathering process, i.e. from contracting the 
land to gatherers. 
Availability of so much cash income is blamed in the local 
discourse in Golok for changing pastoralists’ approach to other 
jobs, where yields are not commensurate with effort. Here is 
one of the fundaments of the critique of the social side effects 
of the Ophiocordyceps business. One encounters this critique 
when trying to theorize the meaning of yartsa gathering for 
the life of pastoralists in Golok. Instead of praises complaints 
are made, as this by a yoghurt factory owner: 
Of course it doesn’t make any sense to 
produce milk for us, of course. We pay 
only 3.5 yuan per jin of milk and we expect 
regular deliveries. Who would like to work 
like that?
Indeed, a number of informants admitted that they throw 
away sheep skins and even yak hides as not worth carrying 
to market. Apart from such extremes, the availability of the 
new income encourages pastoralists to reduce their reliance 
on livestock production (a growing number of households 
do not sell any butter and cheese or any yaks). Compared 
with the ease of earning yartsa income, sheep breeding 
becomes economically “irrational.” Costs include not only the 
shepherd’s salary and land rent, but also labor in herding or 
during the lambing period. 
MARKETS 
Domkhok lies a short drive from the town of Tawu. The 
township’s simple roads connect the pastoralists’ winter 
quarters with the town and the township seat “village”. There 
is no public nor commercial transportation services available, 
and only with their private vehicles can the pastoralists reach 
Tawu. In 2007-2010 cars and motorcycles were in general 
use. Increased contact with town whose meat stalls invite 
buyers all day long can discourage the pastoralists from 
breeding their own sheep.  
 Prior to 2000, according to informants’ recollections, 
when they did not have their own transportation, they 
rarely went shopping, and the amount of non-homemade 
food products they consumed was lower than today. Home 
ground tsampa (rtsam pa), meat from home-slaughter and 
milk products were the basics the families relied upon. Today, 
informants are reducing consumption of their own animals 
in favor of rice, vegetables, noodles and flour-made dishes. 
They admit they slaughter half the number of yaks (for home 
consumption) they did a decade ago. With cars or motorcycles 
(every household in the survey owned at least a motorcycle), 
the Domkhok pastoralists can go to town more easily, and 
usually once a week they fetch a new supply of vegetables, 
fruit and meat. In the most exceptional cases, informants 
declared that they go to town every second or every day.
 Markets with their butcher shops are thus now easier 
to access. The pastoralists also have disposable cash from the 
caterpillar fungus business enabling them to regularly shop 
at the market. They can buy their beloved mutton instead of 
breeding and slaughtering their own sheep. The two trends 
(buying mutton and selling off sheep) strengthen each other: 
the fewer sheep people own, the more mutton they need to 
purchase from the market, and the more people buy the less 
sense they see in keeping their own sheep. With the widely 
available market supplies of mutton, one more argument for 
keeping sheep is countered. 
YAKS 
The declining sheep population should also be analyzed 
in relation to numbers of yaks. Township officials ascertained 
that not only the sheep but also the yak population is declining, 
although at a lower rate. However, my survey did not confirm 
this claim. Its results show that Domkhok pastoralists keep 
more yaks than the official sheep-to-grassland ratio allows. A 
reliable local source said that as much as 40 percent of all yaks 
in the township are those beyond the prescribed limit. This 
could be checked, for example, with local veterinarians, who 
dispense livestock vaccination shots: while “within-the-limit” 
animals receive them at public cost, those for the shadow-
sphere-yaks must be paid by the herders. 
A preference to have large herds of yaks has been 
discussed by many authors. It was analyzed as a method of 
keeping savings, an insurance against sudden livestock losses 
or a compensation for the animals’ low productivity and late 
reproductive maturity (Farooquee 1998, Levine 1999, Yan et 
al. 2002). It has been argued that killing “too many” animals is 
against the Tibetans’ respect for life, and hence something the 
pastoralists try to avoid. On the other hand, a sea of ink has 
been used to prove that herds that are too large are responsible 
for grassland degradation. A large part of the official discourse 
about desertification and resettlement is based on asserting 
that overgrazing made areas like Martod (rMa stod) County 
in Golok a bleak and devastated land although as recently 
as the 1980s it was still said to be a lush paradise for both 
pastoralists and their yaks. 
The state-launched environmental protection programs 
call for destocking the grassland. Yaks however do not seem 
to be their victims. Pastoralists interviewed explained that, 
practically speaking, yaks are easier to hide if government 
officials come to the highlands to count the animals. The 
statistics show that yak herds are shrinking, but a contradictory 
signal comes from the market. Both the observation of the 
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market and the survey show that the herders 
sell fewer animals and many of them do not 
sell any. Since yak selling patterns require long 
term research no conclusive statements can be 
issued here. It is certain though that within the 
years covered by my study it became popular 
in Domkhok to sell few or no yaks at all.27 
The avoidance of selling livestock and 
increased reliance on other sources of income 
has been also noted from Golok by Costello 
(2008: 74), and from Yushu TAP by Gruschke 
(2008: 18). It is also reported from Bhutan 
where people in areas drawing their income 
from fungus gathering stop selling their 
yaks.28 Some scholars see this decrease in 
livestock sales as a sign of the ability to adapt 
one’s livelihood strategies to changes in the 
market (Fischer 2008: 36). However, this is 
problematic for officials I interviewed, as it 
contradicts the official data. Asked directly how 
yak numbers can drop when the herders sell 
less, they claimed that the animals’ mortality 
and people’s consumption still keep the herds in check. But 
the Domkhok pastoralists, as I have noted, eat fewer animals 
from their own herds and instead choose to rely more on 
purchases from the butcher.29
An explanation of why people sell their sheep should 
also examine why they are so reluctant to sell yaks. The 
reasons  given by informants range from prices that are 
too low to Buddhist precepts that invoke compassion and 
suggest refraining from selling yaks for slaughter. Among the 
pastoralists interviewed the Buddhist explanation was more 
common. One could ask why the sheep do not receive the 
same compassion.
The preference for large herds of yaks needs reinvestigation 
in places like Domkhok, which no longer belong to the 
sphere of the subsistence economy. Large herds of yaks are 
not as crucial for the pastoralists’ survival as they used to be. 
Yaks are not necessary to moving camps, since pastoralists 
now have cars. And who spins yak hair into tent cloth when 
black tents are now a rarity? Theoretically speaking, sheep, in 
the herders’ own words, have some advantages which yaks 
lack. They grow faster and are more easily converted into 
cash. But now cash comes mainly from caterpillar fungus. 
Yet, it is not only economic reasoning which can make one 
27. I asked informants who had not sold their yaks whether or not 
they worried about the future condition of their pasturelands. The answers 
suggested what was already described by Breivik (2007: 59ff): that the 
pastoralists connect the lower productivity of the land to the plague of insects 
and rodents, human interference in the landscape (mining), and fencing the 
land rather than to the stocking numbers. 
28. Dorji Dhradhul, pers. comm., Xining, June 6, 2010, Tshitila, pers. 
comm., December 12, 2010. 
29. Also in Yushu pastoralists slaughter fewer of their own animals, but 
buy them from others and have them slaughtered (Andreas Gruschke, pers.
comm., February 7, 2011). 
sell sheep but not yaks. This difference in the fate of these two 
animal species touches upon a bigger issue of different ethos 
or values connected to these two (yak and sheep) branches of 
the pastoral economy and different functions these two have 
(or used to have). 
Is it that by selling sheep the pastoralists can “win” 
something in debates about yak numbers? This correlation 
between lower sheep and growing yak numbers needs further 
investigation, but it can be posited that the yak population 
grows at the expense of sheep. In case of stronger pressure 
from environmental policies, the pastoralists can argue that 
by selling off their sheep they have contributed to pastureland 
conservation. An official from Domkhok admitted that in a 
situation of choice the pastoralists would sacrifice their sheep 
first. In this context, the decision to sell off sheep can have a 
strategic value: of safeguarding the right to keep yaks. 
DISAPPEARED SHEEP: CONSEQUENCES AND 
COMMENTS 
In their 1986 book Poverty of Plenty Bai and Wang tried 
to explain the striking differences between the economically 
advanced Eastern parts of China and her rural, Western regions. 
Over two decades have passed since the book appeared, 
and the authors might wish to adjust their opinions today. 
Certainly they are not the only ones to think that in pastoral 
regions of Tibet there are some intrinsic determinants of 
economic underdevelopment which do not let their residents 
move up the ladder of progress. The authors’ diagnosis, 
unfavorable to the pastoralists, reads: “In comparison with 
developed regions the rural inhabitants of backward regions 
are clearly characterized by a general lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit and an excessive adherence to old ways”. Furthermore, 
their “interpersonal relations (…) are clearly characterized by 
a weak commodity sense in economic relations and a strong 
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depends on a specific local situation. Thus it is important to 
be cautious in extrapolating findings from one area to others. 
For example, the new environmental policies create frames 
within which selling off the sheep may appear to be the right 
move, but the degree to which they impact the pastoralists’ 
decision making process can vary. In Domkhok Township, 
which enjoys a rather positive environmental situation, the 
environmental policies can support the pastoralists in their 
choices, but do not determine what they finally do. At the 
same time, in areas which are affected by land degradation 
and ecological resettlement, the situation can be different, and 
pressure for environmental protection is more strongly felt in 
decision making.31 
None of the reasons discussed in this article is sufficient 
and none of them necessary for the trend to sell off the sheep. 
None but one: without the emergence of the lucrative income 
from the caterpillar fungus, the sheep selling trend, with 
its scale as noted from the area studied, would be difficult 
to imagine. The impact of the caterpillar fungus boom is 
important also because many other phenomena in the local 
society are closely connected to it—the pastoralists’ increased 
integration with and dependence on the town markets is a 
consequence of improved transportation and availability of 
cash income, and this again relates to Ophiocordyceps. The 
availability of the yartsa income is the only factor, among 
those discussed, which suffices to cause a response like this 
(in this situation, other things being equal). It could suffice 
hypothetically, because neither the decline in sheep numbers 
nor the caterpillar fungus gathering business can be analyzed 
separately from the bigger picture of the realities of social life 
and economy in Domkhok. Complementary reasons, like 
changes in the family size and grassland productivity, are also 
important. 
The case of Domkhok demonstrates something else as 
well. A small number of families that did not follow the sell-
the-sheep-off trend and continue to maintain their animals, 
would be labeled in the terminology of social science as 
“deviant cases” (Kendall & Wolf 1955). They show how and at 
what cost the sheep economy can be maintained. Interestingly, 
these families explained their faith in sheep breeding in terms 
of their emotional attachment or its cultural importance for 
Golok society. With some effort, some Domkhok families 
are able to keep their sheep—but only if they are willing to 
organize an additional workforce and invest their savings in 
it. In other words, they are willing to subsidize an economy 
which is not extremely profitable, but perceived as having 
a value beyond its immediate material aspect. Thus if the 
emergence of the caterpillar fungus cash economy gave the 
pastoralists the power to make choices and give up what they 
31. What is so far reported is that the pastoralists sell their sheep off 
expecting some move from the local authorities but not as a reaction to it. 
Knowing of the plans to enforce new stocking quotas, some nomads started 
selling off their livestock early, before prices declined when everybody would 
have to sell (observation from Tanlag, 2009, Jarmila Ptackova, pers. comm., 
November 20, 2010).  
traditionalism in social relations.” All this, the authors argued, 
is reinforced by low educational standards, low exposure 
to mass media and weak information flow, lack of proper 
transport and scarcity of market towns which do not help 
the pastoralists develop “more rationality” in their economic 
thinking (1991: 38, 48, 55ff). If this rationality depended on 
exposure to television (TV sets have successfully made their 
way into the pastoralists’ houses) and was a function of better 
connection to markets, the Domkhok pastoralists must have 
by now gained, in Bai and Wang’s theory, the ability to “think 
economically.” 
None of the individuals quoted in this paper, neither those 
who sold their sheep off nor those who say they are determined 
to keep them, openly referred to economic arguments. This 
ostensible lack of economic arguments could be misleading, 
when the decision itself appears to be of an economic nature. 
Some could argue that it is the snowball effect which drives 
dozens of households to sell their sheep after the “first one” 
did so several years ago. Others propose that it is a forced 
move and that the pastoralists are involuntarily following 
the dictates of the state’s new policy. But is there indeed no 
“economy” in the herders’ reasoning? 
There are numerous arguments against sheep, but 
not many in favor of continuing sheep breeding. In the 
pastoralists’ own words, decreased labor availability and 
insufficient grassland resources are the main reasons for their 
abandoning sheep production. Production for the market 
appears senseless due to low returns (in comparison with 
other alternatives) and high opportunity costs. Keeping their 
flocks for subsistence production is not a necessity anymore. 
Better access to town and the pastoralists’ closer integration 
with the commodity market make mutton purchases 
possible at almost any time when meat is needed. Not by 
coincidence did the sheep business lose its attractiveness 
during the increase of profits generated from the caterpillar 
fungus economy, which injected large amounts of cash into 
the pastoralists’ budgets. The emergence of this new source 
of income has strongly affected rural livelihoods and tipped 
the scales in favor of the cash economy at the expense of the 
traditional, essentially subsistence-oriented economy. The 
sheep had to pay the price. 
The phenomenon of “disappearing sheep” is reported 
from Golok and other Tibetan pastoral areas of China—those 
where caterpillar fungus trade is an important part of the local 
economy.30 It varies in dynamics and scale, and also in the 
set of reasons precipitating the herders’ decisions. They result 
from the interplay of a range of factors, whose significance 
30. Decline in sheep numbers has been observed throughout the Three 
River Source National Nature Reserve (Ptackova: 2010). This could suggest 
that it is the ecology-oriented state policies which stand behind the sheep 
“disappearance.” Yet, sheep breeding has also declined in Bhutan, wherever 
caterpillar fungus contributes to the local economy (Tshitila, pers. comm., 
December 12, 2010). But no decline in sheep numbers has been observed in 
Western Tibet (in TAR) where pastoralists do not depend on the caterpillar 
fungus trade for their income (Melvyn Goldstein, pers. comm., November 
17, 2010).
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saw as, for example, overly hard work, it also gave them a 
chance to continue it by providing the capital necessary to 
overcome the difficulties in sheep breeding which today’s 
pastoralists face. 
Sheep do not prove to be a powerful cultural constraint 
in Golok, and since Golok and Wranakh nomads are yak 
rather than sheep herders, losing sheep from their cultural 
landscape does not have to cause much harm to the 
pastoralists’ identity: yaks are more makers of the status quo. 
With the grassland itself the story may unfold differently. 
Cutting the number of sheep makes the pastureland look less 
crowded—this is what the policy planners desire. Yet, it is 
debatable if removing the sheep from the grasslands really 
could bring about the improved health of the environment. 
Indigenous environmental organizations in Golok stress that 
only sheep and yaks together guarantee the optimal use of 
the grassland and are alarmed that taking the sheep out of 
the yak-sheep-horse trinity, which has been the essence of 
past grazing regimes in the highlands, can cause more serious 
trouble under the flag of saving the environment than the 
sheep would really do. 
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